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THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE
CLINTON B. STEWART of the Colorado Bar*

The purpose of this paper is to explore the employer's right
to discharge employees as that right exists today. During the
past fifty years labor has risen to be a potent economic and social
force. The struggle of labor has resulted in encroachments by
the unions upon employer prerogatives. Management has felt the
impact of labor through legislation and collective agreements curbing the rights of management as they were known under laissez
faire. This paper is chiefly concerned with the effect of the collective union contract upon the employer's right to discharge. It
is hoped that it will point out the ways in which the union contract has affected this right, how the contract deals with the subject, who may enforce the contract, and what seems to be some
of the modern trends. Legislative restraints upon the employer
are mentioned only in passing. Arbitration has been given incidental treatment because the author feels that a detailed report
on arbitration would be too consuming for the purposes of this
paper.
Most union contracts recognize the employer's right to discharge employees; at the same time the contracts attempt to limit
the right to "just cause". The importance of the contract is demonstrated by a recent case, Jenkins v. Thompson, in which the
court said that a contract of employment is a prerequisite to a
cause of action for wrongful discharge.1 This is verified in an
early Colorado case in which the court said that the employees
of a railroad company have no cause of action based upon discharge where they have no contract for a stipulated time.2 It is
interesting to note that in another Colorado case where the court
was considering a discharge for cause under an individual contract, it was held that every contract for hire of services, whether
for a definite or indefinite time, is subject to the right
of the em3
ployer to discharge the employee for sufficient cause.
Where the union contract does limit the employer's right
many questions have arisen. Some of these are: Is the employee
a third party beneficiary? Is the Union the agent of the employee?
Is the contract enforceable by the employee though his term of
employment is indefinite? Must the employee be a member of the
union that negotiated the contract?
It should be remembered that the most substantial gains of
labor did not come until after 1932. The Norris-LaGuardia Act
in Section 2 declared the public policy of the Federal Government
which recognized the employees' right to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing without coercion on
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law
251 S. W. (2d) 325 (Mo., 1953).

Frank v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 23 F. 123 (1885).
'Little

v. Dougherty, 11 Colo. 103, 17 P.

292 (1887).
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the part of the employer. 4 The courts were slow to recognize the
rights of employees under collective agreements where the subject of dispute involved provisions included primarily for the
benefit of the individual employee. The law is by no means settled,
but by this time certain definite patterns are reflected by the cases.
Early history is not of great significance in considering this
subject, except that the reader should keep in mind the fact that
under laissez faire the employer enjoyed a minimum of restraint.
The first collective agreement that tended to limit the employer's
control over discharge and discipline was negotiated in 1890 by
the International Typographical Union. 5 The law on the subject
is still quite new, yet it may be said that the rights of individuals
under these contracts now seem to be generally recognized.
LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO DISCHARGE

There are two basic forces which restrict the right of the
employer to discharge employees. Legislation by the federal and
state governments reflects the intervention of government as a
third party in labor disputes restricting the rights of management.
The .collective contract reflects not only the effect of this legislation, but also the rise of labor to a bargaining plane with management.
Present legislative and contract restraints running against
the employer represent compromises between both employees and
management.' The employee on the one hand is interested in job
security to prevent economic loss through loss of wages. He must
also face the stigma attached to a discharge and finally face the
possible prospect of securing new employment. The employer must
have a strong means by which to maintain discipline. Yet he must
consider the consequences of a discharge. A strike or strained labormanagement relation may result. He must preserve harmony to
continue efficient production and, of course, he must consider the
cost of training new employees.
The Norris-LaGuardia Act through its declaration of public
policy, as mentioned before, undoubtedly had considerable force
in paving the way for the modern collective contract. This then
offered an indirect restraint upon the employer. Next the Wagoner7
Act limited the employer's right to discharge for union activitits.
Discharge of an employee for union activities is an unfair labor
practice under Sections 7 and 8 of the Act. Under the Wagoner
Act the employer can be forced to reinstate an employee where
the employer has violated Section 8 (a). The railroad workers
have found similar protection in the Railway Labor Act of 1926.
These acts have provided the main limitations upon the employer's
prerogative of discharge; however, minor limitations appear in
Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U. S. C. 102 (1940).
John A. Lapp, How to Handle Labor Grievances, National Foremen's Insti.
tute, Inc., p. 44 (1946).
6 C. C. H., Labor Relations, Vol. 5, Union Contracts, Sec. 51,501 (1953).
7
National Labor Relations Act, 51 Stat. 5 (1937), 29 U. S. C. 158.
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other federal statutes. For example, the Selective Service Act
prevents discrimination against a veteran upon return to his employment after discharge from the armed services.8 This is by
no means a complete review of the federal law as it pertains tc
this subject, but to add more would go beyond the scope of this
paper. State legislation has been specifically excluded.
The union contract, limiting the right of the employer to discharge, progressed rapidly after federal legislation recognized
individual rights of employees. Most contracts affirm the right of
the employer to discharge; in fact, the contract may state that
"The full power of discharge and discipline lies with the employer". 9 But the contract does not end here. This power of discharge is limited to discharge for "just cause" or "for good cause"
or "good and sufficient cause". 10 In the early days of collective
contract, the term "just cause" must have been a fruitful area of
litigation. Most of the contracts with the larger industries still
recognize the employer's prerogative but provide for arbitration
as a means of disposing of disputes over discharge. Arbitration
awards will be treated more extensively later in this paper. As a
matter of illustration, it has been held that the discharge was for
just cause where the employee was inefficient, where he had beer
careless in the use of equipment, where he violated company rules,
where he had been drinking on the job or was drunk on the job,
or where company equipment had been sabotaged by the employee.
The employer has the right to lay off employees under an economy
move, however, he should use care that the layoff does not indicate
discrimination for union activities. 1 1
ENFORCEMENT OF THE CONTRACT PROVISIONS

The real force in the union contract restricting the employer's
right to discharge rests in the power to enforce this provision.
Historically, it might be safely stated that prior to the NorrisLaGuardian Act (1932), the general rule was that the employee
had no right of action against the employer for a wrongful discharge in violation of the contract. 12 This rule has been supported
on various grounds. Some of these were: that the employee did
not ratify or adopt the contract, and the union was not his agent;
that the employee's individual contract with the employer was for
an indefinite period, and the contract remained unenforceable for
want of reciprocity; that the contract was between the union and
the employer and was not intended to operate between the employer and employee; that the employee was not a member of the
union at the time the contract was executed; or that the employee
was not within the class of employees intended to be benefited by
the contract. It should now be pointed out that there is a definite
1C. C. H., Labor, Vol. 5, Union Contracts, Sec. 51,502 (1953).
'John A. Lapp, How to Handle Labor Grievances, 45 (1946).
"Ibid, p. 45.
"Prentice-Hall Labor Course. Sec. 4296 (1953).
"31 Am. Jur. 880, Labor, Sec. 119.
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shift to the view that collective agreements are enforceable by
the employee on the theory that the employees are third party
beneficiaries, or that an agency relation existed between the union
members or employees and the bargaining agent. 13
There seem to be about twelve states which recognize the coliective contracts a.s third part-, beneficiary contracts independent
of adoption or ratification by the employee.14 Adding to these the
states which will enforce the contracts if ratification or adoption
is shown, those requiring employment for a definite term, and,
those which follow the agency theory, the general rule could be
stated that the courts will permit the employee to sue on the collective contract where the cause of action arises from provisions
made for his sole benefit as distinguished from the provisions intended to be effective only between the employer and the union.'With this background, it is clear that the attorney will encounter one or more of the following questions:
1. Could the employee enforce the wrongful discharge
provision if it were contained in a contract between
himself and the employer?
2. Must the employee adopt or ratify the contract?
3. Is the wrongful discharge clause for his own benefit
or the benefit of the union?
4. Must the employee be a member of the union at the
time the contract was executed?
A review of some of the cases will demonstrate the various
views that the courts have taken on the question of wrongful discharge. In the case of Swart v. Huston, the court refused to let
the employee recover for wrongful discharge because the employee had no contract for a definite term.1 6 He could terminate
without a liability running to the employer; and since there was
no reciprocal remedy in favor of the other party, the contract
would not be enforceable for want of mutuality. The court said
that the collective agreement standing alone would give the employee no rights, but hinted that had the contract been adopted
or ratified in the individual contract of employment, then it might
be enforceable though the court did not indicate the theory of
action that should be used. 17
In the case of Kessell v. Great Northern R. Co., the court
refused to permit an employee to sue on a collective contract where
the cause of action was based upon the methods and rules of discharge, upon the theory that the contract was intended to operate
between the employer and the union.' s There was no individual
' Ibid, 1954 supplement, p. 97, Sec. 119.
"18 A. L. R. (2d) 367.
1518 A. L. R. (2d) 367.

11154

Kans. 182, 117 P.

(2d)

576 (1941).

"But see Johnson v. Am. R. Express Co., 161 S. E. 473 (1932), infra p. 11,
where the court construed a union contract to create a definite term by implication based upon the limitation running against the employer.
Is51 F. (2d)

3'04 (W.

D., N. D. 1931).
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contract with the employee. In a Canadian case, Young v. Canadian
N. R. Co., the court refused to allow the employee an action upon
the ground that there was no privity between the employer and
the employee. 19 In this case the employee was a member of a rival
union at the time the contract was executed.
Some of the cases attempt to distinguish between the employer's right to discharge independent of the contract and the
right as controlled by the contract. This was pointed out in the
case of Dierchaw v. West Suburban Dairies, in which the court
placed the burden on the employee to show that he went to work
pursuant to the agreement before he could claim the benefit of the
contract.2 0 In this case the employee was not covered by the contract; therefore, the employer merely exercised his unqualified
right to discharge.
From these cases it should be noted that some courts will
not enforce the contract because it is only between the employer
and the union; others require that there be a definite term of
employment; others require adoption or ratification; and still
others would limit the right to members of the union negotiating
the contract. In none of the foregoing cases was the employee
allowed a cause of action based upon a provision which would
appear to be in the contract for the sole benefit of the individual
employees. Should they not have qualified as third party beneficiaries under the contract?
Turning now to the more modern view which holds the collective contract to be enforceable. One of the most interesting
opinions on the theory that the employee may enforce the contract
as a third party beneficiary appears in the case of Yazoo & M. V.
R. Co. v. Sideboard.21 This case seems to ;epresent the modern
trend. After the court reviewed the history of labor contracts, it
stated:
• . . these rulings have been left in the rear in the advancement of the law on this subject, and the holdings
now are that these agreements are primarily for the
individual benefit of the members of the organization,
and that the rights secured by these contracts are the
individual rights of the individual members of the union,
and may be enforced directly by the individual.
It should be pointed out here that the court enforced the contract
as a third party beneficiary contract, but that the wording above
quoted would seem to indicate that the court would limit the action
to members of the union. The opinion also limits the employee's
action to provisions that are for his own immediate benefit. It
would seem then that the test under these cases should be as here
quoted:
o 4 D. L. R.

"276

542.

Ill. App. 355 (1934).

- 161 Miss. 4, 133 S. 669 (1931.).
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Provisions in a collective labor agreement which
limit the employer's right of discharge have been generally held enforceable by an individual employee as inserted for his benefit, where such a provision would have
been valid and enforceable had it been part of an individual employment contract.22
This test would recognize that the primary obligations of the contract are between the union and the employer, but that the incidental benefits to the employees would be protected by giving them
a cause of action. It would seem that the membership in the union
would not be a condition of enforcement.
The next inquiry should be directed to the extent of employees'
rights as third party beneficiaries. The most important factor
seems to be that the employee must first be within the particular
class of employees intended to be benefited. This is largely a
matter of interpreting the contract. In Yazoo & M. V. R. Co. v.
Webb, the court had to first consider this question before it could
consider the merits. 23 There the court pointed out that where the
contract was made for the benefit of a particular class, members
of that class could enforce the terms of the contract regardless of
union membership. Where the employee was not within the class,
he would have no action unless the provisions were specifically
extended to include him.
It has been generally held that a collective labor
agreement made between an employer and a labor union
for the benefit of all the employees, or a class of employees,
may be enforced by an individual employee within the
scope of the agreement, even
though he is not a member
24
of the contracting union.
This would seem to be in harmony with the philosophy of the National Labor Relations Act which limits bargaining to a single representative body.2 5 In considering this matter one court said, "A
bargaining agent under the National Labor Relations Act or under
the Railway Labor Act is but an agent for a principal". As an
agent, the union "is duty bound to represent fairly not only its
own membership, but all the employees in whose behalf it has
authority to bargain". 26 It should be remembered that the right
of discharge as considered in this portion of the paper is the right
as affected by the contract with the union independent of legislation creating other restraints, and, therefore, we are concerned
with the enforcement arising out of state-created rights and not
federally-created rights.
218 A. L. R. (2d) 361.
3C.
C. A. Miss., 64 F. (2d) 902 (1933).
18 A. I R. (2d) 370.
2National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U. S. C. S. 159(a)
(1940).
- Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Engineers v. Tunstall, 163 F. (2d)
289 (1948).

July, 1954

DICTA

A minority of the states let the employee sue on the contract
upon the theory of agency. The union is the agent of the employees
under this theory. This becomes important from the standpoint
of determining who are principals. In at least one case, Shelley v.
Portland Tug & Barge Co., it was held that a non-union employee
would have no action for wrongful discharge under a collective
agreement.27 The court denied the action because there was no
showing the union had authority to act for non-union employees.
It is interesting to note the position taken by one court which
was concerned with the enforcement of a collective contract where
the question of definiteness in time was raised. 28 In this case the
court held that the term of employment could in effect be construed
to be for a definite time because the contract bestowed a substantive right upon the employee during the life of the contract and
restricted the right of the employer to discharge only for the life
of the contract.
ARBITRATION PROVISIONS
The net effect of union contracts has been to restrict management's rights to discharge for "just cause" only. The evolution
in this area has been to work out a satisfactory system for determining what is "just cause" without the necessity of resort to the
courts in each instance. The author has examined twelve union contracts with various large employers and without arbitration exception has been provided for as an end result. 29 Arbitration has distinct advantages to both the union and management at least where
individual grievances are concerned. It provides a much faster
method of handling disputes than resort to the courts. The employee can afford to pursue this remedy if he feels the employer violated the contract, and the employer in a relatively short time knows
the bounds of "just cause". The arbitration machinery utilized for
handling other union grievances may be made available to handle
discharge cases if the parties so provide in the contract. Where
this is provided for the contract will generally state that the arbitrator is to expedite discharge cases.
Most union contracts set out a system of handling disputes
by mediation first and provide for arbitration only as a last resort. These contracts generally provide for notice to the employee
and a representative of the union with a specification of the reasons
for the discharge. The employee must then seek a hearing within
a specified period (two to five days). This first hearing is at the
shop or department level with the foreman and a union representative. If this fails, the employee or union may seek a hearing
before a company-wide representative official or officials and a
similar representative from the local union. If still no settlement
is reached, then a further appeal might be taken to a board con"158 Ore. 377, 76 P. (2d) 477 (1938).
Johnson v. American R. Express Co., 163 S. C. 191, 161 S. E. 473 (1931).
-' C. C. H. Labor Relations, Vol. 5, Union Contracts, Sec. 51,502 (1945).

DICTA

July, 1954

sisting of company officials and representatives from the parent
union. Then if these negotiations fail or either party is not satisfied, the matter may be submitted to an arbitrator as provided in
the contract. The decision of the arbirtator is specifically stated in
the contract to be final and binding on the parties.
Where the contract provides for arbitration, the employee
must pursue his cause as provided in the contract or he has no action at law. In the case of Swilley v. Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co.,
the court held that an employee could not sue at law on the ground
of wrongful discharge where he failed to exhaust the remedy
provided in the contract. 30 But there is also an obligation on the
part of the employer to follow the terms of the contract in the
settlement of a discharge dispute. It was held in the case of Moore
County Carbon Co. v. Whitten that an employer could not raise the
defense that the employee had not complied with the provisions of
the contract31 where the employer had prevented the employee from
complying.
A discussion of arbitration would not be complete without
considering Rule 109 of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure.
If the collective contract meets the requirements of this rule then
The party in whose favor any award shall be made, may
file the same with the clerk of the district court of the
county wherein the matters were arbitrated, who shall
enter a judgment thereon, and if such award requires the
payment
of money, the clerk may issue execution there32
for.

If the agreement does not come within the proscription of this
rule, then the employee, where successful, would have to sue in
court on the contract to enforce the award. The contract would
meet the requirements of the rule if it was in writing and provided
for arbitration therein, if the parties are to be bound by the award,
and if it provides for the filing with the court and
issuance of
33
execution as a means of enforcement of the award.
CONCLUSION

There now remains little doubt that a majority of the states
will recognize the rights of individual employees to enforce a contract which limits the employer's right to discharge to "just cause"
only. It would seem that the cases would line up in the following
manner:
1.

'C.
311C.
2

Where a state recognizes third party beneficiary contracts
and the court will construe the contract to be one, the employee may sue for wrongful discharge though his term of
employment is indefinite providing he is within the class of
C. A. Texas, 96 S. W. (2d) 105 (1936).
C. A. Texas, 140 S. W. (2d) 880 (1940).

Colo. R. C. P. 109(e).

33

Ibid, 109(b).
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2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
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employees intended to be benefited by the contract. Union
membership would not be necessary.
Where the state recognizes third party beneficiary contracts and the court will construe the contract to be one,
but requires the third party to acknowledge the contract,
then the employee must ratify or adopt the contract before he has a cause of action. Union membership would
be immaterial.
One test that would assist in determining if the provision
should be enforced as a third party beneficiary provision
is to determine whether the provision would be enforceable
between the employee and the employer if it were in an
individual contract. Most wrongful discharge cases meet
this test.
Where the state refuses to construe the contract as a
third party beneficiary contract, the employee may still
have his cause of action based upon the theory of agency,
but in these cases it would seem that the burden of showing that the agency existed at the time the contract was
executed is upon the employee. This could preclude a
non-union employee or a member of a rival union from
an action based on the collective contract. Under this doctrine union membership must have existed at the time the
contract was executed. No cases have been found by the
author demonstrating the effect of the agency doctrine as
set out in the National Labor Relations Act where the
employee relied upon the act to establish the agency.
In jurisdictions that refuse the employee recovery because the contract was intended to operate only between
the union and the employer, there is no action that accrues
to the benefit of the employee; however, there are strong
indications in some cases that the employee could claim
the benefit of the contract if he adopted it as a part of his
individual contract. It is not clear whether he would sue
here as a third party beneficiary or on the theory that it
is his own contract.
Some jurisdictions might still refuse to extend the benefit
of the wrongful discharge clause to employees on the theory
that though the collective agreement may be for a definite
term the employee's individual contract is not for a definite
term, and if he is free to terminate at any time and for any
cause, there is no reciprocal provision running in favor
of the employer, thus making the contract ineffective for
want of reciprocity. As has been pointed out, this has
been overcome in at least one case reported by construing
the substantive right of the employee with the restriction
limiting the employer as creating a definite term. The
theory of the indefinite term does not seem to have the
general approval of the courts.
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If the employee does have a cause of action which was created
by the union contract, his rights are then limited according to the
terms of the contract. Where the contract provides for arbitration, he must follow the arbitration procedure or forfeit his cause
of action unless the employer's acts have prevented him from
complying with the contract. If the state has an arbitration statute
which gives summary effect to an arbitration award where the
contract meets the provisions of the statute, then he need not sue
to enforce the award; however, where he cannot qualify under the
statute, he must sue in the proper court to enforce the award.
Arbitration seems to meet with general approval, at least, where
the dispute concerns the rights of the individual employee for
discharge.
Modern legislation coupled with the restrictions of the collective contract have greatly altered the position of the employer
from that of his predecessor under laissez faire. It may be that
the employer today is suffering for the delinquencies of the past;
however, taking all matters into consideration, he has not suffered
too badly in this one instance because he can still discharge for
"just cause". Except in limited circumstances, it would seem that
the burden should not be unbearable when weighed in the light of
public and individual gains.

SOCIETY FOR CRIPPLED CHILDREN
To better serve handicapped children and adults in Colorado, and particularly in Metropolitan Denver, the Denver
County Society for Crippled Children is attempting to assume
full financial responsibility for the operation of Sewall House,
Denver's Therapy Center. The State Society is an administrative organization that assists outlying counties. Previously,
the State Society had contributed some $20,000.00 annually
toward the support of Sewall House.
Any bequests or gifts intended to benefit and/or provide
treatments for crippled children and adults at Sewall House
should be made out to the Denver County Society for Crippled
Children and Adults, Inc.
This organization, without assistance from Community
Chest or United Funds, has been serving the crippled of all
races and creeds, regardless of their ability to assist in any
payment, since 1939.
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STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN
LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
FRED S. KAWANO*

LABOR LEGISLATION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
POWERS OF THE FEDERAL AND STATE GOVERNMENTS

The scope of governmental intervention in the field of labormanagement relations mirrors the increase in government apparent in other fields of economic and social endeavor. Due to the
complexities resultant upon the transition to high industrialization, the early philosophy based on the doctrine of laissez faire
has, by necessity, given way to one of increased governmental activity.
The advent of the participation of government in industrial
affairs has produced problems not only economic in nature, but
legal and constitutional as well. Under the 10th Amendment to
the Constitution, the Federal Government is said to possess only
delegated powers, while the States are said to be custodians of
residual powers. This dual system of government has made it
rather difficult to deal with many modern social and economic
problems, including labor problems and labor legislation; often
the Supreme Court has been obliged to decide whether or not each
of the political divisions is acting within the sphere established for
it by the Constitution of the United States.
Police power, defined by many authors as a power inherent
in government to protect itself and all of its constituents,' is the
basis upon which the states have passed most of their laws dealing with labor, health, safety, morals, and general well-being of
the people. However, the exercise of police power has created
jurisdictional conflicts between the Federal and State Governments. This often occurs when the state attempts to legislate and
solve labor problems in the same field in which the Federal Government, acting under and by virtue of the Commerce Clause, also
has legislated and claimed jurisdiction.
The Federal Government derives its jurisdictional power primarily from the Commerce Clause and secondarily, from the
"Necessary and Proper Claudse.'"2 When interstate commerce is
involved, and the Federal Government has constitutional jurisdiction, the problem of the area of state jurisdiction is manifest.
Early in our constitutional history, it was decided that the Commerce Clause, standing alone, does not bar state regulation of
activities of a predominately local concern, where nationwide uniformity of regulation is not imperative, even though the activities
involve or affect interstate commerce. 3 At the same time, how*Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
IPrentice-Hall, Labor Course (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1954), p. 1039.
^U. S. CONST., Art. I, §8 (3) and (18).
'Houston v. Moore, 1820, 5 Wheat. 1, pp. 20-23.
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ever, it was decided that the affirmative grant of power to regulate
commerce, coupled with the Supremacy Clause and the Necessary
and Proper Clause, enabled Congress to close the door completely
to state regulation even in these areas. 4 It followed, therefore,
that the scope of state regulation, in areas in which Congress could
regulate, was subject to the will of Congress.
Congress, of course, may specifically state that state regulation shall be paramount to Federal law.5 Where Congress has
clearly manifested its intention either to premit or to preclude
state jurisdiction, nothing remains for the courts but to give
effect to Congressional judgment. Courts have assumed that the
remaining area was open to state regulation where Congress manifested no intention with respect to the survival of state regulatory powers and where there was no evidence that Congress had
even considered the problem.,
But, if Congress intended comprehensively to treat (whether
by regulating or by leaving free from regulation) a particular
subject, i.e., if it intended to "occupy the field", the states are deprived of jurisdiction. "The laws of the United States . . .shall
be the Supreme Law of the Land". [The Constitutionof the United
States, Article VI, (2)]. The task of the court is not that of determining whether or not state law applies 7 but rather to determine the scope of the "field" which Congress intended to be
occupied. Specific legislation was thought of by Congress as comprehensive treatment of some segment of human activity; within
that segment or field, matters, not expressly dealt with, are deemed
to have been deliberately placed outside the bounds of regulation
and the states may not interfere with the Congressional scheme
by regulating these activities. The delineation of the "occupied"
field necessarily rests on the attitude of the court and the public
with respect to federal authority generally, and the relative merits
of the federal and state labor laws.8
NLRA AND THE CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
Twenty-five years ago, there was no general federal labor
law. Today, the National Labor Relations Act is virtually a complete code of labor legislation. Both the Wagner Act of 1935, the
original NLRA, and the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments thereto
(known as the Labor Management Relations Act) empowered the
National Labor Relations Board to act "whenever a question affecting commerce" arises concerning representation of employees.
The Board may investigate such controversy and certify . . . the
representatives that have been designated ;9 it is "empowered .. .
S. CONST., Art. VI (2); and Art. I, § 8 (18).
NLRA, Section 14 (b); Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relation Board, 336 U. S. 301, 49 A. L. C. 239 (1949).
6 Charleston, E. Carolina R. R. v. Varnville Co., 237 U. S. 297, p. 604; Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Porter, 273 U. S. 341, pp. 345-346 (1926).
Missouri Pacific R. R. v. Porter, Ibid.
Prentice-Hall, Labor Course, p. 4168.
9
LMRA AND NLRA, §9 (c); I. A., 29 U. S. C., §141 (b).
'U.
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to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . .affecting commerce".' 0
The term "commerce," the basis of NLRB jurisdiction is defined as "trade, traffic commerce, transportation, or communication among the several states or between the District of Columbia
or any foreign country,"" and the related term "affecting commerce" means "in commerce or bordering or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce or having led or tending to
lead to a labor dispute bordering
or obstructing commerce or the
12
free flow of commerce."'
The Wagner Act contains no provision relating to the jurisdiction of state boards or concerning the delegation of jurisdiction to them by the NLRB. Although language relating to "exclusive jurisdiction" appears in Section 10 (c), a prohibition of
action by state boards was not intended. Congress, by this language, intended to exhaust its powers under the Constitution
and extend coverage of the law to the fullest extent legally permissable.13 In any event, all businesses, however small and however "local" in character, 14could be made subject to the law, except
in de minimus situations.
Even though the potential jurisdiction of the Board was extensive, it was neither practical nor wise for it to expand its coverage any more than was absolutely necessary. Since every business has a situs within a state, local authorities have a vital interest in labor relations of a business, physically present therein.
These practical considerations led the old Board to decline jurisdiction over many businesses which were usually regarded as
"local" in character except where the business was an integral
part of a company engaged in interstate commerce; a local branch
or a subsidiary corporation,'5 or a business servicing one engaged in
interstate commerce. 16 Since the state boards, during this era,
quite frequently exercised jurisdiction over "local" businesses and
even asserted jurisdiction admittedly in interstate commerce where
the NLRB did not act for budgetary or other reasons, this policy
of NLRB was calculated to promote maximum labor peace.
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 made two changes in Section
10 (a) of the Wagner Act: It eliminated the reference to "exclusive" jurisdiction and providing for delegation to state boards,
under certain conditions. Section 10 (a) of the NLRA provides
as follows:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor
practice (listed in Section 8) affecting commerce. This
"LMRA AND NLRA, §10 (a).
,LMRA AND NLRA, §1 (6); and LMRA, §503 (3).
,NLRA AND LMRA, §1 (7); and LMRA, §501 (1).
,' Polish National Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U. S. 643.
' 4 NLRB v. Fairblatt, 306 U. S. 601.
Atlantic Co. v. NLRB, 65 NLRB 1274.
"Trinidad Brick and Tile Co., 67 NLRB 1351.
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power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law or otherwise: provided, that the
Board is empowered by agreement with any agency of
any State or Territory to cede to such agency, jurisdiction over any cases in any industry (other than mining,
manufacturing, communications, and transportation, except wherein predominantly local in character) even
though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting
commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial
statute applicable to the determination of such cases by
such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of this7 act or has received a construction, inconsistent
therewith.'
The T-H Act also expressly sanctions state legislation which imposes greater restrictions on union shop and other forms of union
security than are provided by the federal act,'8 and exemplifies
the basic principle that Congress may specifically provide that
state regulation shall be paramount to Federal law.' 9
Although the language of the Wagner Act, relating to "commerce" and "affecting commerce", was unchanged, certain fundamental changes in the structure and purposes of the federal labor
relations law made it inevitable that the Board would expand its
operations. Membership was increased from three to five and five
panels of three members each were set up. 20 The budget of the Board
was also increased. New procedures were introduced, and additional Unfair Labor Practices (ULP's) were designated. However, the Board did not feel compelled to extend its coverage to
include all businesses which might technically be subject to jurisdiction and continued to decline jurisdiction over local businesses
where the exercise of its jurisdiction would not, in its view,
"effectuate the purposes of the act".
In 1950, the Board announced that, because of its heavy load
and limited budget, it would, in the future, take jurisdiction only
over those businesses in which a labor dispute would have a
"pronounced impact upon the flow of commerce".-' Subsequently,
in eight simultaneous decisions, the board set forth the "yardsticks" by which it intended to measure this impact. The Board
said it would take jurisdiction over the following types of businesses:
1. Instrumentalities and channels of interstate and foreign
commerce
2. Public utility and transit systems
17NLRA, §10 (a).
18LMRA, §14 (b).
"Ibid.
'LMRA, §3 (a) (b).
2 Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 NLRB 635; National Gas Co., 99 NLRB 273;
and Brooks Wood Products, LABOR LAW REVIEW, 13004.
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3. Integral parts of multi-state enterprises
4. Enterprises, annually shipping $25,000 worth of goods out
of state
5. Enterprises, annually supplying $50,000 worth of services
or materials to interstate enterprises
6. Enterprises, annually purchasing $500,000 worth of materials from out of state
7. Enterprises, spending $1,000,000 on purchases from local
suppliers of interstate materials
8. Enterprises, whose total purchases and sales, expressed in
percentages of the minimum requirements, equal 100%
2 -2
9. Establishments, substantially affecting national defense
This list is subject to additions or deletions, or even alterations of
the existing tests, at any time. The Board may find it desirable
to make such changes because of changes in its budget or case
load, or for policy reasons. Also, the Board's "yardsticks" are so
comprehensive, when construed broadly, persons or industries
that seemingly would be considered predominantly local in character, 23 also would seem to be included.
When an employer or union questions the jurisdiction of the
Board, claiming that the business is essentially local in character,
the Board decides the question in a case by case basis. All the
petitioner can do is to file his petition and wait, often for many
months, to learn whether the Board will exercise jurisdiction.
Where the Board has construed Section 10 (a) of the Act narrowly
state boards have been deprived of jurisdiction, not only of interstate business where the NLRB has failed or refused to act, but
also that which is intrastate in nature. Thus, this creates a "no
man's land" in the field of local business. In addition, although
deprived of access to the NLRB, small or local businesses will
continue to be subject to the civil, equitable, and 2criminal
pro4
visions of the act, if the business "affects commerce".
In other cases, NLRB has allowed the state to remain free to
punish, on traditional non-labor relations grounds, acts of violence
and coercion by individual employees, who, unless acting as
agents of a union, are immune to the ban imposed by Section 8 (b)
1-A of the Act. The NLRB has also stated that although an employee's assault upon a union organizer may amount to "interference" within the prohibition of Section 8(a) (1) of the National
Act, the states retain jurisdiction to punish such an assault as a
police court matter. 25 Since the National Act pre-empts only the
field of labor relations law and policy, the states are not precluded
from applying ',) unions, employers and employees the same legal
and policy standards which are applicable to all citizens generally.
Prentice-Hall, Labor Course, p. 4028.
Breeding Transfer Co., 95 NLRB 1157; Prentice-Hall, op. cit., p. 4031.

1E. L. Schwartz, A No Man's Land in Labor Relations, LABOR
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(Chicago, Ill.: Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1949-50), Vol. 1, No. 3, p. 189.
2Arlon
Studios, 74 NLRB 1158; Spalik Engineering Co., 45 NLRB 1272;
Revlon Products Corp., 48 NLRB 1202; Paragon Die Casting Co., 27 NLRB 878
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CASES INVOLVING STATE AND FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Supreme Court Decisions
Union Security: Although union shop agreements are permitted under federal law, the NLRA does not authorize any union
security agreements where state law prohibits or regulates them.2 6
In Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, (op. cit. supra), the NLRB certified local
1521 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners as
bargaining representatives for the production employees of Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co., a Wisconsin company, whose activities affected interstate commerce. Moreau, an employee of
Algoma, filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board
unfair labor practice charges arising out of his discharge. The
Wisconsin Board agreed with Moreau and held that the maintenance of a membership agreement between the company and the
union was invalid because it was not preceded by the authorization
elective required by the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. It
ordered Algoma to reinstate Moreau with back pay. The union
and employer brought the case first to the Wisconsin Courts and
thereafter to the United States Supreme Court on the theory that
the Wisconsin Board had no power to act; that since a maintenance
of membership agreement was lawful under the NLRA, and the
State law to the contrary should not govern. The plaintiffs relied
on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, but the United States
Supreme Court disagreed. There was no doubt, the Court conceded, that Algoma was subject to the NLRA, but this fact did not
mean that Algoma was exclusively subject to the NLRA. The
Company would be exclusively subject to the NLRA only if that
act expressly or implicitly revealed a Congressional intention to
pre-empt either the whole field of labor relations law or, at least,
compulsory unionism. Legislative history and the Act, said the
Court, clearly indicated an intent not to interfere with state laws
relating to compulsory unionism. Accordingly, Algoma was under
a duty to observe the requirements of the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act. The state board had jurisdiction to find that Algoma
had committed an unfair labor practice and remedy it.
In the Plankington case,2' 7 the NLRB certified the United
Packing House Workers of America (CIO) as exclusive bargaining representative of the Plankington Packing Co., an interstate
business. In February, 1945, pursuant to directive of the NLRB,
the union and the company executed a maintenance of membership agreement. Stokes, an employee, attempted to resign from
the union, but the union did not accept the resignation. Once
again, after a finding by the Wisconsin Board, similar to the one
in the Algoma case, the state and federal judicial circuit was
travelled. On appeal from the State ruling, a Wisconsin Circuit
-NLRA, §14 (b).
- WERB v. Plankington Packing Co., 16 Labor Cases.

64,910 (1948).
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Court held that the State Board acted beyond its power. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court and, relying on
the Algoma case, held that there was room for the Wisconsin act to
apply, notwithstanding the fact that the company involved was
subject to the NLRA. This time, however, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Wisconsin Court in a per curiarn
decision. Since the Wisconsin Board had ordered Plankington to
reinstate Stokes with back pay, the Supreme Court reversal required
Plankington to do neither. In the Algoma case the sole issue was
that of the maintenance of a membership agreement. In the
Plankington case the legality of the discharge of employee Stokes
in no way rested on the legality of the maintenance of membership
agreement once he had tendered his resignation to the union within the "escape period". Accordingly, the agreement simply was
not applicable to Stokes. The decision could have been based only
on one other provision of the Wisconsin Act which declared it to
be an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization by discrimination
in hire, tenure, terms or conditons of employment. When the
provision is applied, conflict between the National Act and the State
Act becomes apparent. The National Act contains an "employerdiscrimination" provision virtually identical to that of the State
Act.2 8 Where there is a possibility of conflict existing, the basic
principle of "occupation of the field" operates to deprive the state
of jurisdiction. Section 10 (a) of the NLRA clearly discloses that
the NLRB's jurisdiction over unfair labor practices,
defined in
2 9
Section 8 of the NLRB, was meant to be exclusive.
Representation Cases: In the Bethlehem Steel case 20 the
NLRB had refused to certify a union as a collective bargaining
agent for supervisors. The New York Board entertained a representative petition filed by foremen employed by a company engaged in interstate commerce. In a suit instituted by the employer challenging the New York Board's assumption of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court held that the New York Board had
no power to act. The essential fact, according to the Supreme
Court, was that both the Federal and State governments had attempted to govern an identical phase of employer-employee relationship and had delegated, to their respective agencies, a discretion which could result in conflicting decisions. In an opinion
written by Mr. Justice Holmes the court stated: "When Congress
has taken the particular subject matter in hand, coincidence is
as ineffective as opposition . . .If the two Boards attempt to exercise a concurrent jurisdiction to decide the appropriate unit of
representation, action by one, necessarily denies the discretion of
the other. The State argued for the rule that would enable it to
'NLRA, §8 (a) 3.
'A. K. Garfindel, Conflict Between Federal and State Jurisdiction, LABOR
LAW JOURNAL (1949-50), Vol. 1, No. 13, pp. 1027-1044.
0Bethlehem Steel Co. v. NYLRB, 330 U. S. 767, 67 S. Ct. 1026.
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act until the Federal Board had acted in the same case. But we do
not think that a case by case test of federal supremacy is permissible here. The Federal Board has jurisdiction of the industry
in which these particular employers are engaged and has asserted
control of their labor relations in general. 31 It asserts its power
to decide whether these foremen may constitute themselves a bargaining unit. We do not believe this leaves room for the operation
of the state authority asserted."
In another representative proceeding,3 2 the Supreme Court
invalidated a certification granted by the Wisconsin State Board
to the Telephone Guild, an independent union. The Guild had
filed a petition with the NLRB while negotiations were pending
between the company and the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL, for renegotiation of a contract. The Guild
withdrew its petition before the NLRB had acted upon it and filed
with the State Board. The State Act and the Wagner Act differed
in the procedure to be followed in determining the bargaining
unit. Considering the differences, the Court stated: "The Wisconsin Supreme Court concluded that the Wisconsin Board could exercise jurisdiction here until and unless the National Board undertook to determine the appropriate bargaining representatives or
unit of representation of these employees . . . In the Bethlehem
Steel Case, on p. 776, we rejected that argument, saying, 'The
State argues for a rule that enables it to act until the Federal
Board has acted in the same case. But we do not think that a case
by case test of federal supremacy is permissible here.' We went
on to point out that the National Board had jurisdiction of the industry in which the particular employers were engaged and asserted control of their labor relations in general. Both the State
and Federal statutes had laid hold of the same relationship and
had provided different standards of regulation. Since the employers in question were subject to regulation by the National
Board, we thought the situation too fraught with potential conflict to permit the intrusion of the State agency, even though the
Board had not acted in the particular cases before us."
The Bethlehem and La Crosse cases appear to stand for
the proposition that once the NLRB assumes jurisdiction in
an industry, the jurisdiction becomes exclusive. Although the
La Crosse case involved inconsistent regulation, the language
in the opinion made it clear that even consistent regulation would
be prohibited under the Wagner Act.
Despite the exclusive character of jurisdiction, there are certain aspects of interstate labor relations subject to state regula31See, J. L. Walsh, Local Business, LAUOR LAW JOURNAL (1949-50), Vol. 1,
No. 10, pp. 783-788, 828, for industries in which the NLRB has asserted jurisdiction (footnote added).
La Crosse Telephone Corporation v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Board, 336 U. S. 18.
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tion; local regulation is permitted
when it is determined that no
33
intent to pre-empt is disclosed.
Concerted Activities and Unfair Labor Practices: In the
Allen Bradley case, 34 employees of the company engaged in interstate commerce, struck and engaged in mass picketing of homes
of other employees and also threatened violence to non-strikers.
Such activities were considered unfair labor practices under Wisconsin law. The State Board accordingly issued a cease and desist order. The Supreme Court upheld the state action, holding
that Congress had not made such employee-union conduct subject
to regulation by the Federal Board. It should be remembered that
union practices were not tested as "unfair" until the passage of
the Taft-Hartley amendments.
In the Briggs and Stratton case,35 the union, during contract
negotiations, called frequent unannounced meetings during working hours in order to pressure the company. The local board ordered the union to cease and desist, and in a five to four decision
the United States Supreme Court upheld the state action. The
majority stated: "There is no existing or possible conflict or overlapping between the authority of the Federal and State Boards, because the Federal Board has no authority either to investigate,
approve or forbid the union conduct in question. Although "What
Congress has given, the state may not take away", Congress, in
Section 7 of the NLRA, had not given protection to intermittent
work stoppages.
A later case 36 involved the validity of a Michigan statute requiring a strike notice to the State Mediation Board, a waiting
period, and a majority strike vote. The Supreme Court unanimously
held the state law unconstitutional and reasoned, "None of these
sections (NLRA, Section 7, 8 (b) (4) and Section 8 (d) and Section 13) can be read as permitting concurrent state regulation of
peaceful strikes for higher wages. Congress occupied this field
and closed it to state regulation." The Briggs and Stratton case
was distinguished as involving an activity which the Court regarded as "coercive", similar to the sit-down strike or labor violence and thus subject to state police power.
Later a Wisconsin statute, providing for compulsory arbitration and prohibiting strikes in public utilities, was held unconstitutional.3 7 The decision was based on the theory that jurisdiction,
once assumed is38 exclusive, and the states thereby are precluded
from regulating.
I International Union Local 232 v. WERB (Slowdown could be restrained
by State Board), 69 S. Ct. 516 (1949); Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. WERB,
Ibid.
Allen Bradley Local 1111 v. WERB, 315 U. S. 745 (1942).
International Union, UAW v. WERB, 336 U. S. 245, 49 A.L.C 177 (1949).
International Union, UAW v. O'Brien, 339 U. S. 454, 50 A.L.C. 436 (1950).
"Amalgamated Association of Railway Employees v. WERB, 340 U. S. 381,
51 A.L.C. 201 (1951).
38Prentice-Hall, "NLRA," Labor Course (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1954), p. 1169.
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The trend toward federal jurisdiction over unfair practices
was supplemented in a recent decision.3 9 Trucking business operators sought to enjoin picketing on the ground that its purpose
was to coerce operators into violating the state statute forbidding
an employer to encourage or discourage membership in labor organizations by discrimination in hiring, tenure of employment,
or any condition of employment. The Court of Common Pleas
of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, entered a decree restraining
picketing and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the decree and dismissed the bill for want
of jurisdiction and the operators brought certiorari. The United
States Supreme Court held that the operators' complaint fell within the NLRB's jurisdiction to prevent unfair labor practices, and
that Pennsylvania, through its courts, could not decide the same
controversy and grant its own form of relief.
Several conclusions may be drawn from these cases.
Union Security. Although union ship agreements are permitted under federal law, the NLRA does not authorize any union
security agreements where state laws prohibit or regulate them.
Representation Cases. The states may not deal with questions
of representation in industries over which the NLRB has consistently exercised jurisdiction. Presumably, the states may take
jurisdiction in cases where it is an established NLRB policy to
decline to adjudicate.
Concerted Activities and Unfair Labor Practices. Employee
activities which are affirmatively protected as "concerted activities" by the NLRA, Section 7, may not be regulated by the states.
Employer-employee activities which fall within the unfair labor
practices set out by the NLRA, Section 8, also may not be regulated
by the states. However, where affirmative protection of the activity is absent, the field which Congress will be deemed to have
"pre-empted" by Section 7 and 8 of the NLRA will be limited to
40
the matters with which the Act is expressly concerned.
State Court Decisions
When a union or employer files a petition with the NLRB, the
Board will initially decide whether or not it has jurisdiction to
resolve the controversy by resorting to the Act. When a union
or employer files a petition with the State Labor Board, the State
Board will, in theory, look to its own labor acts and also the
NLRA to determine whether it has jurisdiction. When the State
Board wishes an injunction to be issued it must turn to the state
courts. At this. time the state court should determine whether the
Board has jurisdiction over the matter. (In Colorado, it is not
necessary that the union or employer go to the State Industrial
Commission; it may go directly to the court.)
"Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers Local Union No. 776 (AFL),
74 S. Ct. 161, 22 L.W. 4055 (1953').
40Prentice-Hall, "NLRA," 1954, pp. 4168-4169.
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Although state boards and courts should look to the NL
local jurisdiction, more often than
RA in order to determine
41
not this is not done.
Often it is very difficult to decide the question of jurisdiction.
Without a doubt, the state courts have jurisdiction over torts or
crimes. However, criminal or tort punishment is remedial and
an injunction against the commission of the same does not, necessarily, fall within the state police powers. It would seem that if the
pre-emption and conflict doctrine is to be applied, the state court
should not enjoin a crime or tort about to be committed if such
crime or tort is within the prohibition of the National Act. Once
violent picketing or assault upon an individual or employer has
ensued, action for damages would lie. However, state courts often
prohibit such conduct in the interest of preserving the peace.
In the past it has been the practice of the NLRB not to appear
in state court litigations. When cases involving issues of conflict
and pre-emption reach the Supreme Court, the NLRB, with approval of the Solicitor General, has appeared as amicus curiae.
In view of the budgetary and administrative considerations with
which-the Board is faced, it would neither be practical nor wise
for the Board to look into every state court case involving issues
of conflict and pre-emption. The Board's budget and heavy workload does not permit it to assign such work to the staff. Therefore the opportunity and responsibility for effectuating Congressional policy, in so far as the "pre-emption and conflict" matters
are concerned, depends to a great extent upon local administrative and judicial agencies.
CONCLUSION

Although Federal jurisdiction is limited to interstate and
foreign commerce, Congress has, in addition, jurisdiction over
any business "affecting" commerce. This judisdiction is derived
from the Necessary and Proper Clause which permits federal
regulation of any activity which prohibits, promotes, or affects
interstate commerce.
The Power of the NLRB has extended into local communities
to such an extent that frequently little jurisdiction appears to be
left to the agencies set up by the state acts. Although subject to
the civil, equitable and criminal provisions of the Act, local businesses are often deprived of access to the NLRB due to budgetary
and administrative consideration or the narrow construction of
Section 10 (a) of the Act. The jurisdictional "yardsticks" have
aided in narrowing the field over which Congress may exercise its
jurisdiction; however, these are subject to alteration, deletion,
or changes by the Board when it deems it expedient.
" See for example, Central Storage and Transfer Co .v. Teamsters, 30 LLRM
2379, 21 Labor Cases, 67,034, 67,035; Montgomery Building and Construction Trade Council v. Ledbetter Erection Co., 29 LLRM 2415, 57 So. (2nd) 112;
Goodwin, Inc. v. Hogehorn, 303 N. Y. 300, 101 N. E. (2nd) 697; Art Steel Co. v.
Velazquez, 21 Labor Cases,

66,728, 29 LLRM 2329.
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The NLRB can agree to cede jurisdiction over certain industries to state agencies, but the NLRB can not cede jurisdiction over
mining, manufacturing, communications or transportation unless
these industries are predominantly local in character. Furthermore, state laws governing the industry in question, must not be
inconsistent with corresponding provisions of the Federal Act.
The pre-emption doctrine has restricted the conflict between
the NLRA and state laws with respect to such fields as unfair labor
practices, certification and union security contracts. However,
recent state cases in which injunctive relief against various types
of concerted activity has been granted do not contain consideration of the fact that the enjoined conduct falls within the preempted field. This seems particularly true where state courts have
granted injunctive relief to private parties against secondary boycotts and where stranger picketing and organizational strikes
have been enjoined on the ground that the objective of the concerted activity is unlawful under either the State or Federal law.
If easy evasion of the Supreme Court's pre-emption
policy is to be avoided, state regulation, which in fact
duplicates, or complements the protection afforded under
the Federal Act, can not be permitted to stand and if
application of the state law forfeits the rights guaranteed
by the National Act or obstructs effectuation of National
policy, the state law can not be given effect.
If the pre-emption policy is given effect in the spirit
of the Supremacy Clause, it will, as Congress intended it
should, aid in reducing Federal-State jurisdictional conflicts, and point the way to desirable improvements 42
in
federal law in the field of labor management relations.
4

M. G. Ratner, Problems of Federal-State Jurisdiction in Labor Relations,
(1952), Vol. 3, No. 11, p. 815.
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THE RIGHT TO STRIKE BY PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
GERALDINE R. KEYES*

In the past, all strikes in the public service have been held
to be against the public interest and, therefore, illegal per se.
Recent years have seen an extension of the definition of public
interest so as to include many groups of employees of private
industry. With this extension of the term public interest to employees in private industry, there should be a concomitant withdrawal of the application of this term to employees of a governmental jurisdiction whose work no more affects the public interest than like groups in private industry.
Labor has been a potent factor in the national socio-economic
picture for the past twenty-five years. Statutory law and judicial
decisions have defined the rights and privileges of employees in
private industry ensuring them of the right to organize, bargain
collectively and strike. Labor relations in the public service have
been neglected chiefly because the government has taken the
position that it is sovereign and has specifically excluded public
employees from the scope of legislative provisions. Public employees have become increasingly aware of the fact that individual action is ineffective in improving the economic and working
conditions of the various levels of government, and this end can
be achieved best through organized group effort.
ORGANIZATION IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Federal employees were successful in obtaining the right to
organize through passage of the Lloyd-LaFollette Act in 1912 1
which provides:
That membership in any society, association, club or
other form of organization of postal employees not affiliated with any outside organization imposing an obligation or duty upon them to engage in any strike, or proposing to assist them in any strike, against the United
States, having for its objects, among other things, improvements in the condition of labor of its members, including hours of labor and compensation therefore and
leave of absence, by any person or groups of persons in
said postal service, or the presenting by any such person
or group of persons of any grievance or grievances to the
Congress or any member thereof shall not constitute or
be cause for reduction in rank or compesation or removal
of such person or groups of persons from said service.
The right of persons employed in the civil service of the
United States, either individually or collectively, to petition Congress, or any member thereof, or to furnish
* Written while a student of the University of Denver College of Law.
1 37 Stat. 555, 5 U. S. C. 652.
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information to either House of Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered with.
Although the Act relates specifically to postal works, it has been
interpreted to give all federal workers the right to organize within
limits without fear of executive reprisal. The first federal agency
to enter into formal agreement with a union representing its staff
was the Post Office Department.2 The initial agreements dealt
with seniority, promotions and hours of labor. Today other federal agencies engage in some degree of collective bargaining with
their employees. The Securities and Exchange Commission, National Labor Relations Board, United States Housing Authority,
Inland Waterways Corporation, Tennessee Valley Authority,
Bonneville Power Administration and the Alaska Railroad all
engage in some form of collective bargaining.
As a general rule, unless prohibited by statute, most states
and their municipalities permit their employees to form employee
organizations. Virginia permits its employees to organize but
not with labor unions who have for a purpose the discussion of
conditions of employment or who claim the right to strike. It is
contrary to the public policy of Virginia to recognize or bargain
collectively with a union.3
New Jersey has also declared by
statute that public employees may organize. By resolution of its
board, the city of Lancing forbids its policemen to organize. Alabama law states that it is contrary to its public policy for employees to organize, because the right to organize carries with it
the right to strike. 4 The city of Dallas passed an ordinance in
December, 1942, which flatly forbids city employees to form any
kind of labor organization. It declares:
It shall be unlawful for any officer, agent or employee,
or any group of them, of the city of Dallas, to orgauiize a
labor union, organization or club of city employees or to
be or become a member thereof, whether such labor
union, organization or club is affiliated or not with any
local, state, national or international body or organization whose character, by-laws or rules govern or control
its members in the matter of working time, working contions or compensation to be asked or demanded of the
city of Dallas.5
The constitutionality of this ordinance as a reasonable and proper
regulation was upheld in Congress of Industrial Organization v.
Dallas.!
The city of Bridgeport, Connecticut passed an ordinance in
1946 which stated that it was the public policy of the city to permit
' Spero, Sterling D., GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER, p. 361 passim.
Virginia, Senate Joint Resolution, No. 12, February 8, 1946.
H. J. Resolution No. 142, July 10, 1940.
Spero, Sterling D., GOVERNMENT AS EMPLOYER, pp. 30, 31.
198 S. W. (2d) 143 (Tex. App., 1946).

4Alabama,
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city employees to organize. A recent Connecticut case permitted
-a voluntary public school teachers' association not only to organize
: but also to bargain collectively for the pay and working conditions
!which it might be in the power of the Board of Education to grant.'Another recent court decision reaffirmed the right of public employees to form employee unions and to engage in activities therein even though they may be prohibited from striking." One of the
strongest statements made by a court with regard to the right to
organize was in a Missouri case, City of Springfield v. Clause:"
All citizens have the right, preserved by the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections 8 and 9 of Article I of the 1945 Missouri Constitution, Sections 14 and 29, Art. 2, Constitution of 1875, to
peaceably assemble and organize for any proper purpose,
to speak freely and to present their views and desires to
any public officer or legislative body . . . Organization by
citizens is a method of the democratic way of life and
most helpful to the proper functioning of our representative form of government. It should be safeguarded and
encouraged as a means for citizens to discuss their problems together and to bring them to the attention of public
officers and legislative bodies. Organizations are likewise helpful to bring public officers and employees together to survey their work and suggest improvements in
the public service as well as in their own working conditions . . . Organizations of other state, county, and
municipal officers are well known and have long been
recognized as serving a useful purpose ...
The above quotation is typical of the general attitude towards
employee organizations. The denial of the right to organize has
been limited almost entirely to organizations of policemen, firemen and teachers. 0
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

Any discussion of collective bargaining is usually prefaced
with the statement made by President Roosevelt, a firm believer
in the labor movement, to the effect that:
The process of collective bargaining, as usually understood, cannot be transplanted into the public service.
It has its distinct and insurmountable limitations when
Norwalk Teacher's Ass'n v. Board of Education of City of Norwalk, 138
Conn. 269, 83 A. (2d) 482 (1953).
'Broadwater v. Otto, 370 Pa. 311, 88 A. (2d) 878 (1953).
'356 Mo. 1239, 206 S. W. (2d) 539 (1947).
"Police: Fraternal Order of Police v. Harris, 306 Mich. 68, 10 N. W. (2d)
310 (1943) ; City of Jackson v. McLeod, 199 Miss. 508, 24 So. (2d) 319 (1946) ;
Firemen: Carter v. Thompson, 164 Va. 312, 180 S. E. 410 (1935) ; McNatt v.
Lawther, 223 S. W. 503 (1920); Teachers: Fursman v. Chicago, 278 Ill. 318,
116 N. E. 158 (1917); Seattle Chapter of A. F. of L. v. Sharpless, 159 Wash.
424, 293 P. 994 (1930).

270

DICTA

July, 1954

applied to public personnel management. The very nature and purposes of Government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the
employer in mutual discussions with Government employee organizations. The employer is the whole people
who speak by means of laws enacted by their representative in Congress. Accordingly administrative officials
and employees alike are governed and guided, and in
many cases restricted, by laws which establish policies,
procedures or rules in personnel matters. Particularly,
I want to emphasize my conviction that militant tactics
have no place in the functions of any organization of
Government employees."
The collective bargaining agreements in the Federal agencies have
never been challenged. The problem arises in municipalities which
have limited jurisdiction depending on delegation of authority
from state constitutions, statutes or city charters. Provisions of
a city charter, so far as they deal with hours, wages, and working conditions of city employees, preclude collective bargaining
with respect thereto. 12 Many public bodies, including the cities of
Chicago, Illinois and Denver, Colorado have dealt with the problem in an effective manner by adopting the policy of paying the
prevailing wage that similar work pays in the community in
private employment. The respective city councils have approved
such wage scales when evidence is presented to them that justifies
the requested wage adjustments.
Other cities have a somewhat hybrid type of collective bargaining. Such collective bargaining agreements are incorporated
in ordinances or resolutions. A Florida court recently upheld the
action of a city which had refused to bargain with its employees
in the water works on the theory that the city charter did not
impose a duty on it to bargain. 1 3 After a similar decision by an
Ohio court 14 holding that the city of Cleveland had no power
either through the state contitution or its city charter to contract
with a union representing motor coach employees, the legislature
passed a law permitting collective bargaining agreements in public
utilities taken over from private ownership where previous collective bargaining agreements were in force. 15 The closed or
union shop contract has been rejected as being a denial of equality
of opportunity of employment, improper discrimination between
classes 16of people and to be restrictive of competition on public

works.

"Letter to Mr. Luther Seward, President of the National Federation of
Federal Employees, August 16, 1937.
1Mugford v. Mayor of Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A. (2d) 745 (1945).
::Miami Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. (2d) 194 (1946).
"City of Cleveland v. Division 268 Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric and Motor Coach Employees, 30 Ohio Op. 395 (1945).
"Ohio Laws, 1945, Sec. 258, July 18, 1945.
" Fiske v. The People, 188 Ill. 206, 58 N. E. 985; Adams v. Brenan, 177 Ill.
194, 52 N. E. 314.
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The author of a recent book on labor problems in government"
criticizes the present method of negotiation because decisions
must be made by administrative officials making it necessary for
courts to set and define the area of negotiation. Without statutory
law to guide them, the courts must look to other statutory law
and to case law of dubious relevance in deciding such matters as
legality of union recognition and affiliation, the closed shop, majority representation, the check off, and other issues relating to collective bargaining in public employment. Godine suggests as a
solution to the collective bargaining problem explicit statutory
prescription of the permissible area of group consultation and of
the criteria to be observed in the making of vital decisions affecting conditions of employment. There should be expressed or
implied legislative approval of important administrative revisions
in the terms of public employment. Maintenance of the open shop
and unrestricted eligibility to union membership should be maintained unless a denial were clearly warranted on such grounds as
dishonesty or a betrayal of associational confidences.18
RIGHT TO STRIKE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

A thorough study of all strikes against the government was
made in 1940. Of the 1,116 strikes studied, the author comments
that "the calling of a strike, regardless of its duration means the
existence of a labor problem, the exhaustion of pleas and patience,
and the accumulation of resentment to the breaking point ... government strikes are normal results of existing maladjustments in
public employment."1 9 Ziskind analyzed that the failure of wages
to rise with the cost of living was the major reason for strikes
coupled with the fact that the usual budget set wages one year in
advance. Those governmental jurisdictions that set wages equal
with the prevailing wages in the community did not have to cope
with the strike problem. Another major cause was the refusal
of officials to permit organization of government workers. A third
important cause was conflict regarding collective bargaining. 'The
unit of government would feel that to bargain was incompatible
with the authoritarian role of government. Other minor causes
involving working hours, affiliation with the general labor movement, discrimination and fringe benefits.
Government workers have been slow to organize and reluctant to strike. Most of the strikes have been promulgated by those
workers in the craft and industrial field who are more closely
aligned with the national trade unions. It is actually remarkable
Godine, Morton Robert,

1' Ibid, p. 283.

THE LABOR PROBLEM IN THE

PUiBLIC

SERVICE,

p. 92.

1' Ziskind, David, ONE THOUSAND STRIKES OF GOVERNMENT EmPLOYEES, Breakdown of strikes; Public legislation and administration 3, public protection 66,
public education 23, public health and sanitation 94, public road construction
72, public parks and recreation 18, public property maintenance 62, publicly
owned utilities 114, public employment projects 664. Many of these strikes
lasted for less than one day and the average was six days.
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that there have been so few strikes considering the lack of recognized procedures for settling labor controversies. Most government unions, affiliated or not, have as a matter of policy adopted a
no strike provision. The public is inclined to take its civil servants
for granted until there is an interruption of the usual services,
and then the concern is the restoration of the services rather than
attempting to correct the working conditions of the public employees.
It was not until the close of World War II with its consequent
labor unrest resulting in a number of strikes that anti-strike legislation was passed. The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947,20 specifically prohibits public employee strikes:
It shall be unlawful for any individual employed by
the United States or any agency thereof including wholly
owned Government Corporations to participate in any
strike. Any individual, employed by the United States
or by any such agency, who strikes, shall be discharged
immediately from his employment, and shall forfeit his
civil service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for reemployment for 3 years by the United States or any such
agency.
There have been no strikes since the passage of this Act and the
validity of this legislation has not been questioned.
About one fourth of the states have passed similar legislation. 21 The Michigan statute is typical and pertinent portions read
as follows:
An Act to prohibit strikes by certain public employees; to provide certain disciplinary action with respect thereto; to provide for the mediation of grievances
and to prescribe penalties for the violations of the provisions of this Act . ..No person holding a position by
appointment or employment in the government of any one
or more of the political subdivisions thereof, or in the
public school service, or in any public or special district,
or in the service of any authority, commission, or board,
or in any other branch of the public service, hereinafter
called a 'public employee', shall strike.
The Act further provides for loss of position, rights and pension
unless reappointed. Reappointment, employment, or re-employIOLabor-Managemeht Relations Act, 29 U. S. C, A., P. L. 101-80th Cong.,
Sec. 305.
21 Indiana Acts
1947, c. 341 (public utilities only); Michigan, Public Acts
1947, No. 336, p. 524; Minnesota, Laws 1947, c. 335 (charitable hospitals); Missouri, Revised Statutes Annotated, 1947, Sec. 10178.207; Nebraska, Laws 1947,
c. 178; New Jersey, Acts 1947, Senate 323 (public utilities only); New York,
Gen. Laws 1947, c. 391; Ohio, Code Supp. 1947, Sec. 17-7; Pennsylvania, Laws
1947, p. 1161; Texas, Laws 1947, c. 135; Virginia, Laws 1946, c. 333; Washington,
Laws 1947, c. 287.
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ment are conditioned on not receiving any more salary than was
received at the time of the violation. No salary increase can be
granted for one year and the employee is on probation for two
years. The constitutionality of the Act was tested in Detroit v. Division 26 of Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric Railway
and Motor Coach Employees of America. The court held that the
right of public employees to collectively refuse to render the services for which they are employed differs in legal point of view from
the right of private employees to strike and that the classification
of public employees for purpose of applicable legislation was valid.
The court recognized that the operation of a transit system was
a proprietary activity of government but held that this
constituted
2
engaging in a public enterprise for a public purpose. Experts advocate differing opinions on the right of public
employees to strike.2 3 Some adopt the view that government is
different and that no one has the right to strike against the government at anytime under any circumstances even though this
is not the view they express with regard to employees in private
industry. A number of reasons have been advanced in support of
their conclusions: the state is sovereign and cannot tolerate defiance on the part of its employees; the state represents all of the
people and all groups and cannot yield to the pressure of one
group; conditions of employment in the public service are fixed
by law, unilaterally, and cannot be made the subject of bargaining
and bilateral agreements as in a treaty between sovereign powers;
the principal employment decisions are made by legislative bodies,
not by executives, and consequently a strike is directed against
the ultimate representative assemblies, which by definition cannot
and in the general interest ought not to have their free decision
foreclosed by force. These sentiments were echoed by a New York
court in the following language :24
To tolerate or recognize any combination of Civil
Service employees of the Government as a labor organization or union is not only incompatible with the spirit
of democracy, but inconsistent with every principle upon
which our Government is founded. Nothing is more dangerous to public welfare than to admit that hired servants
of the state can dictate to the Government the hours, the
wages and conditions under which they will carry on essential services vital to the welfare, safety and security
of the citizen. To admit as true that Government employees have power to halt or check the functions of Government, unless their demands are satisfied, is to transfer
to them all legislative, executive and judicial power.
Nothing would be more ridiculous.
The reasons are obvious which forbid acceptance of
12

332 Mich. 237, 51 N. W. (2d) 228 (1952).
Strikes in the Public Service. 10 PERSON NEL REVIEW (January, 1949).

" Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 44 N. Y. S. (2d)

601 (1943).
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any such doctrine. Government is formed for the benefit
of all persons, and the duty of all to support it is equally
clear. Nothing is more certain than the indispensable
necessity of Government, and it is equally true, that unless the people surrender some of their natural rights to
the Government, it cannot operate. Much as we all recognize the value and the necessity of collective bargaining
in industrial and social life, nonetheless, such bargaining is impossible between the Government and its employees, by reason of the very nature of Government itself. The formidable and familiar weapon in industrial
strife and warfare-the strike-is without justification
when used against the Government. When so used, it is
rebellion against constituted authority.
Another view that is often expressed is that strikes in the
public service are to be avoided, but circumstances may exist and
occasionally do in which a strike is defensible in the public interest
itself and unavoidable in the interest of employees. The belief is
that the right to strike as a means of securing improvement in
conditions of employment is one of the fundamental elements of
liberty in the American sense of the term and has been an incentive in private industry for better management. Government
employees abhor violence and would resort to the strike as a last
resort. Strikes are tolerated in private industry, and yet when
the government is engaged in the same type of activity, the strike
becomes illegal. Justice Buford in a vigorous dissent put it this

way :25
in the operation of its waterworks system, the city acts
in its proprietary or corporate capacity and not in its
sovereign governmental capacity; that in the performance of such activity the city is bound by the same laws
and burdened with the same duties toward its employees
in that activity as may be applicable to any persons or
corporation engaged in like activity.
Strikes in the public service are not necessarily more serious than
those in which private employees are engaged. Certainly a strike
on the nation's railroads, coal mines, or milk industry is more
serious than a strike of file clerks, street sweepers, welfare employees or golf course employees.
The true test should depend on the nature and gravity of the
consequences involved in a strike, whether by the government, a
government corporation, mixed enterprise or a private enterprise
affected with the public interest. A rule that "a strike that would
bring direct, immediate, certain, and serious danger to a primary
interest of the community should be prohibited by law, with adequate sanctions, but also with adequate means to secure full public consideration and solution of the issues involved" would be a
I Miami Local No. 654 v. Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So. (2d)

194 (1946).
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good rule. Certainly the past decisions of some courts would still
be good law under this rule. This is illustrated by the enjoining
of strikes in two hospitals on the grounds that such
2 6 strikes were
contrary to the best interests of the general public.
Both statutory law and judicial decisions discriminate arbitrarily against a large group of Americans by excluding them from
labor legislation and enacting statutes limiting their rights and
privileges. It is clear that there should be an extension of the
definition of public interest to include employees of private industry where cessation of work results in great harm to the public
interest. Strikes should be banned when the public interest is
harmed whether the strike be by private or public employees. It
is important that public employees have the right to strike when
the public interest is not harmed and when the government is engaged in proprietary and not sovereign activities.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - INTERPRETATION AND OPERATION OF COLORADO'S GUEST STATUTE CLARIFIED IN SEVERAL RECENT CASES-The latest, and perhaps the most important, of
the recent guest statute cases is PettingelU v. Moede. 1 In this case
the plaintiff's injury resulted from an automobile accident which
occurred when the defendant driver, who was inexperienced in
mountain driving, applied his brakes and' slid off of an icy highway on a mountain pass. He had been warned to put on chains,
but had not done so as there were "winter" tires on the jeep that
he was driving. The plaintiff, who was a guest and the only passenger, had made no protest on the defendant's driving. There
were only minor variations in the testimony, and the case was
submitted to a jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed from the judgment entered on this verdict, and
the Supreme Court reversed with directions to dismiss the action.
The Court states that recent presentations made to it have
revealed that there is still a good deal of uncertainty and confusion
as to the provisions of our guest statute.2 The statute specifies
three instances where the driver of a vehicle may be liable to his
guest. Neither intentional accident nor intoxication are here involved, so if there is a liability, it has to be on "negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
Admitting that it has previously been said that this phrase is selfevident,3 the Court undertakes to clarify the interpretation of it.
Society of N. Y. Hospital v. Hanson, 59 N. Y. S. (2d)
Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581.
IColo. -,
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 358.
2'35 C. S. A., c. 16, §371.

'Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 45 P. (2d) 940 (1935).

91 (1945); Jewish

July, 1954

DICTA

good rule. Certainly the past decisions of some courts would still
be good law under this rule. This is illustrated by the enjoining
of strikes in two hospitals on the grounds that such
2 6 strikes were
contrary to the best interests of the general public.
Both statutory law and judicial decisions discriminate arbitrarily against a large group of Americans by excluding them from
labor legislation and enacting statutes limiting their rights and
privileges. It is clear that there should be an extension of the
definition of public interest to include employees of private industry where cessation of work results in great harm to the public
interest. Strikes should be banned when the public interest is
harmed whether the strike be by private or public employees. It
is important that public employees have the right to strike when
the public interest is not harmed and when the government is engaged in proprietary and not sovereign activities.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS - INTERPRETATION AND OPERATION OF COLORADO'S GUEST STATUTE CLARIFIED IN SEVERAL RECENT CASES-The latest, and perhaps the most important, of
the recent guest statute cases is PettingelU v. Moede. 1 In this case
the plaintiff's injury resulted from an automobile accident which
occurred when the defendant driver, who was inexperienced in
mountain driving, applied his brakes and' slid off of an icy highway on a mountain pass. He had been warned to put on chains,
but had not done so as there were "winter" tires on the jeep that
he was driving. The plaintiff, who was a guest and the only passenger, had made no protest on the defendant's driving. There
were only minor variations in the testimony, and the case was
submitted to a jury which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The
defendant appealed from the judgment entered on this verdict, and
the Supreme Court reversed with directions to dismiss the action.
The Court states that recent presentations made to it have
revealed that there is still a good deal of uncertainty and confusion
as to the provisions of our guest statute.2 The statute specifies
three instances where the driver of a vehicle may be liable to his
guest. Neither intentional accident nor intoxication are here involved, so if there is a liability, it has to be on "negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others."
Admitting that it has previously been said that this phrase is selfevident,3 the Court undertakes to clarify the interpretation of it.
Society of N. Y. Hospital v. Hanson, 59 N. Y. S. (2d)
Hospital of Brooklyn v. Doe, 252 App. Div. 581.
IColo. -,
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 15, p. 358.
2'35 C. S. A., c. 16, §371.

'Foster v. Redding, 97 Colo. 4, 45 P. (2d) 940 (1935).

91 (1945); Jewish

DICTA

July, 1954

The Court defines negligence as "failure to exercise for the
protection of others that degree of care and caution that would,
under the prevailing circumstances, be exercised by an ordinarily
prudent person." Continuing, the Court says:
For the purpose of properly construing this statute,
ordinary or simple negligence should be considered as resulting from a passive mind, while a wilful and wanton
disregard expresses the thought . . . of an active and
purposeful intent. Wilful action means voluntary . . .
Wantonness signifies . . . that it is wholly disregardful
of the rights, feelings and safety of others . . . To be
'wilful and wanton' there must be some affirmative act
purposefully committed which the actor must have realized as dangerous, done heedlessly and recklessly, without
regard to consequences, or of the rights and safety of
others . . . The demarcation between ordinary negligence,
and wilful and wanton disregard, is that in the latter the
actor was fully aware of the danger and should have
realized its probable consequences, yet deliberately avoided
all precaution to prevent disaster. A failure to act in
prevention of accident is but simple negligence; a mentally active restraint from such action is wilful. Omitting
to weigh consequences is simple negligence; refusing to
weigh them is wilful. Performance of a dangerous act
wilfully, under certain circumstances, . .. is permissible,
and will not subject the actor to liability even under the
guest statute; . . .to be actionable under that statute the
conduct of the driver of the vehicle must be both wilful
and wanton, because a wanton act is never excusable.
A number
of Colorado cases are cited as being in conformity with
4
this.
The Court next considers an instruction which tells the jury
that it may take into consideration whether the defendant, from
the surrounding circumstances and existing conditions, "should
have known that to continue his course of conduct would naturally
and probably result in injury." Should have known has appeared
in previous cases, 5 but it was there never approved by itself and
it has to be taken together with the complete instructions in those
cases. The meaning of those instructions is that the jury can
find from the surrounding circumstances and facts an inference
that the defendant did in fact know of the danger. This is the
same as the method by which intent is determined. Further, the
Court feels that it is possible, under the instructions given in this
case, that the jury might have based liability on the basis of simple
Millington v. Hiedloff, 96 Colo. 581, 45 P. (2d) 937 (1935); Pupke v. Pupke,
102 Colo. 337, 79 P. (2d) 290 (1938); Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85 P.
(2d) 732 (1938); Helgoth v. Foxhoven, 125 Colo. 446, 244 P. (2d) 886 (1952).
Clark v. Small, 80 Colo. 227, 250 P. 385 (1926); Clark v. Hicks, 127 Colo.
25, 252 P. (2d) 1067 (1953).
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negligence alone; it is of course improper to speculate that a jury
selected a correct theory and disregarded a wrong one.
Once it has been established that a plaintiff is a guest, he
then has the burden of proving one of the situations for a recovery
under the statute. Reviewing the evidence in this case, the Court
holds that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff has not sustained this
burden. "If it appears clear that the law is such that the evidence
presented is insufficient, it is the duty of the court to direct a
verdict; if, on the other hand, the evidence is such that reasonable
minds might draw different conclusions therefrom, it is proper
that a jury decide the issue." Accordingly this case was reversed
for dismissal with one dissent on the issue of submission of this
particular case to a jury determination.
Another recent guest statute case is Lewis v. Oliver 6 in which
a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff is reversed for a new
trial. The court states that there is merit in eight of the specifications of error but discusses only the misconduct of counsel
(statements made in front of the jury) and the giving of an instruction on simple negligence. While in the Pettingell case the
giving of such an instruction is unnecessary and confusing, in
this case it says that it is reversible error under the circumstances.
While the word "negligence" is used in the statute, it is well established that each of the three elements that allow recovery by
a guest are something more and beyond negligence as it is ordinarily understood. An instruction on simple negligence has no
place in an action under the guest statute.
A third recent guest statute case is Loeffler v. Crandall7 in
which a directed verdict for the defendant is affirmed. This case
holds, as do the others, that simple negligence will not sustain a
recovery when it has been established that the plaintiff was a
guest. Here it was properly held by the trial court that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiff did not sustain the necessary proof.
The case has an additional element in that it was contended that
the guest statute is not applicable as the plaintiff had agreed to
pay a share of the expense. The Court quotes from a California
case , and follows the rule that a tangible benefit to the driver must
be the motivating influence in furnishing the transportation to
take the passenger out of the guest statuteY Where the main purpose of the trip is joint pleasure, an incidental agreement for
sharing the expense does not overcome the statute.
It is not felt that these cases make any radical changes in the
law of this state; rather it is felt that for the most part they
reiterate existing rules. They do, however, expand on them, and it
is believed that the clarification, which is the announced intention
Colo.-, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No.
Colo. -, 1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No.
Druzanich v. Criley, 19 Cal. (2d) 439, 107
9
cf. Klatka v. Barber, 124 Colo. 588, 239 P.
-

'-

15, p. 356.
14, p. 319.
P. (2d) 445 (1940).
(2d) 607 (1951).
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of the Pettingell opinion, should be achieved to a considerable
extent.
T. H. CHRYSLER.
REAL PROPERTY-SAND AND GRAVEL ARE NOT MINERALS-In the case of Farrell v. Sayre,1 the action was brought
in the form of a request for a declaratory judgment to adjudicate
the rights of the respective parties in regard to certain sand and
gravel located on the plaintiff's property situated in Gilpin County.
The sand and gravel in question cover the entire surface of the
plaintiff's property. It was the contention of the defendant, Sayre,
that the sand and gravel were included in a mineral reservation
which he held in the plaintiff's land. The reservation was in the
following general terms:
. . and excepting and reserving all mineral and mineral
rights and rights to enter upon the surface of the land
and extract the same . . .
Prior to the commencement of this action the plaintiff and
defendant had entered into an agreement whereby the defendant
purported to lease his interest in the sand and gravel to the plaintiff in return for the payment of certain royalties for any gravel
removed. Apparently the trial court felt that this purported lease,
rather than the original reservation, was sufficient evidence of the
intention of the parties to support a finding that the mineral
reservation did in fact include the sand and gravel. That is, because the plaintiff entered into this agreement with the defendant,
his act amounted to a recognition of the defendant's rights in the
sand and gravel.
The Supreme Court in reversing the decision of the trial
court announced the rule to be followed in Colorado in this type
of situation as follows:
The mineral reservation here involved is in general
terms and does not expressly include sand and gravel.
It seems to be the general rule that where the surface of
the land is sand and gravel, a straight mineral reservation does not include the sand and gravel, and where a
similar situation has arisen, the cases turn upon the intent of the paties at the time of the execution of the deed
containing the reservation, when such reservation is in
general terms, and virtually every decision is to the effect
that where the grant in the deed, as here, is nothing but
sand and gravel, it surely was not contemplated that the
parties intended to nullify the grant without some direct
specification in the reservation.
The Supreme Court cites the case of Waring v. Foden 2 as
controlling authority for the following principles: (1) That the
IColo. -,
1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 14, p. 312.
286 A. L, R. 969, 1 Ch. 276 (1932).
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word "minerals" when found in a reservation clause includes those
substances which are exceptional in use, value, and character (2)
That in determining whether a certain substance is exceptional you
must look to the meaning of the word in the vernacular of the
mining world, the commercial world, and whether or not the
parties considered it a mineral at the time of their agreement.
The decision seems a proper one in view of the fact that if
the reservation had included the sand and gravel, which admittedly
covered the entire surface of the land, then all that the plaintiff
had obtained by his deed was a layer of sub soil below the sand and
gravel with an implied easement to use the surface layer which
was the property of the defendant. It is clear that the general
terms in which the reservation was couched does not warrant
such a result without clear evidence of a contrary intent. This
position is further strengthened by the fact that it was admitted
that the defendant, Sayre, had no knowledge that the sand and
gravel had commercial value and that he did not contemplate any
use of it at the time the reservation was made.
The decision illustrates that the word "mineral" is not subject to exact definition but rather is susceptible to limitation or
expansion according to the intention of the parties and the circumstances surrounding its use. The effect of the decision would
appear to be that if a grantor intends to reserve sand and gravel
covering the surface of the land he will have to make a specific
reservation to that effect.
CLYDE J.

COOPER, JR.

REAL PROPERTY-AN ADVERSE CLAIM MUST BE
HOSTILE AT ITS INCEPTION OR THE CLAIMANT MUST
SET UP TITLE IN HIMSELF BY SOME CLEAR, POSITIVE
AND UNEQUIVOCAL ACT.-In the case of Lovejoy v. School
District No. 46 of the County of Sedgwick and State of Colorado I
the School District claimed that it was the owner in fee simple
of certain land and that it was deprived of lawful possession
thereof on or about August 1, 1952, by the defendants, Ben and
Phyllis Lovejoy. It appears that School District No. 68 comprised
a large area of sparsely settled land, and in order to provide accommodations for children of the District, three separate schools
were established known as North 68, Middle 68 and South 68.
The School in question is South 68. No evidence was submitted
whatever on the question of the manner and conditions under
which the District was allowed to enter the land in 1866; however,
in 1908 the State issued its patent to the land to Bessie and Frank
W. Sherman and that patent contained no reservations or exceptions. Numerous conveyances of the property were had thereafter from 1900 to March 2, 1951, when the defendants, Lovejoy,
acquired title by deed; none of the conveyances of the land, with one
negligible exception, contained reservations or exceptions. In
I-

Colo. -,

1953-54 C. B. A. Adv. Sh. No. 13, p. 285.
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1952 School District No. 68 by consolidation became part of School
District No. 46.
In reversing the District Court which held for the plaintiff,
the Supreme Court said:
The very essence of adverse possession is that the
possession must be hostile not only against the true
owner, but against the world as well. An adverse claim
must be hostile at its inception, because, if the original
entry is not opexiy hostile or adverse, it does not become
so, and the statute does not begin to run as against a
rightful owner until the adverse claimant disavows the
idea of holding for, or in subservience to another, it actually sets up an exclusive right in himself by some clear,
positive and unequivocal act. The character of the possession must become hostile in order that it may be
deemed to be adverse. And this hostility must continue
for the full statutory period. 1 Am. Jur., p. 871, Sec. 137.
The statute begins to run at the time the possession of the
claimant becomes adverse to that of the owner, and this
occurs when the claimant sets up title in himself by some
clear, positive and unequivocal act.
No one representing School District No. 68 ever asserted that the District owned the land until immediately
before the commencement of this action. The District,
without color of title to possession, had to be in possession
under an open and notorious claim of ownership. Under
the circumstances here, mere occupancy was not sufficient
to put any of the true owners on notice that the District
claimed the land ...
It appears that by this case Colorado follows the rule that
where one is claiming title to land by adverse possession without
color of title the claim must be hostile at its inception or if not
then it must later become hostile to the true owner's interests. In
this case the land appears to have been public domain before 1908
when the state issued its patent; therefore the District, itself a
governmental organization, could not have made a claim adverse
to the state, for this would have been tantamount to asserting an
adverse claim against itself. Therefore, any time after 1908 the
District could have by an affirmative act put the true owners of the
land on notice. This never occurred and it appears that mere possession of the land was not enough to put the owners on notice
that the land was claimed by the District.
It is clear that by this holding if the owner acquiesed in the
mere occupancy of the land the adverse claimant would be precluded from acquiring title. It seems logical to assume that if the
true owner and the claimant both thought that the land involved
belonged to the latter, the statute 2 would not begin to run be2

'35 C. S. A., c. 40, §136.
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cause, although this might not amount to acquiesence, no act by the
claimant would have put the owner on notice. Therefore, when
the original entry is not adverse to the interests of the true owner
in Colorado there must be a later act done by the claimant which
would put the owner on notice and this act must be "clear, positive, and unequivocal" before the statute would begin to runeven though the claimant had been in exclusive possession of the
land for more than the statutory period.
JOHN BROOKS, JR.

THE DENVER BAR ASSOCIATION
1954-55
OFFICERS
Louis G . Isaacson ........... ...................................
................................................ President
James D. Doyle ....................................................................................
First Vice-President
M ary Seach ......................................................................................
Second Vice-President
Donald S. M olen ....................................................................................
,ecretary-Treasurer

TRUSTEES
To Ju-\Ti

30, 1955

Charles A. Baer
Louis A. Hellerstein

To JUNE 30, 1956
To JUNE: 30, 1957
Richard P. Brown
Mary C. Griffith
William E. Doyle
Robert F. Welborn
Kenneth M. Wormwood, ex officio

GOVERNORS
To JUNE 30, 1956
Raymond B. Danks
Charles E. Grover
Joseph N. Lilly
Robert H. McWilliams, Jr.
Charles E. Works

To JUNE 30, 1955

Richard M. Davis
Joseph G. Hodges
Merrill A. Knight
William Rann Newcomb
Simon Quiat

COMMITTEES
AUDITING AND BUDGET
Norma L. Comstock ....................................................................................... Chairman
Ernest S. Baker
John F. Kelly
Arch L. Metzner, Jr.
Robert H. Close
Irving S. Hook
Richard Tull
Blanche E. Duncan
ENTERTAINMENT
W illiam E. M eyers ..................................................................................................
Cli(ir ina ,
Theodore J. Adams
Charles E. Bennett
John M. Longway
Arnold Alperstein
William P. Horan
John P. Thompson
James T. Ayers
William H. Huseby
William W. Webster

DICTA

July, 1954

ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES
Godfrey Nordmrark................................................................................................ Chairman
Worth Allen
H. Shields Mason
William K. Ris
Frederick P. Cranston
Fred W. Mattson
Fred M. Winner
Theodore Epstein
Forrest C. O'Dell
Albert E. Zarlengo
Sidney S. Jacobs
FELLOWSHIP
Floyd F. Walpole ...................................................................................................... Chairman
Milnor E. Gleaves
Clayton D. Knowles
Victoria F. Gross
Everett E. Smith
INSTITUTE
Harold H. Calkins ...... ...................................................................... Chairman
Wynn M. Bennett, Jr.
Charles R. Hampton
James L. Treece
David J. Clarke
Donald W. Hoagland
Arthur K. Underwood, Jr.
John M. Dickson

Peter H. Holme, Jr.....
Charles A. Baer
Bernard B. Carraher
Stanley H. Johnson

JUDICIARY
..................................................................................... C h airman
Merrill A. Knight
Walter A. Steele
Harry S. Silverstein, Jr. Edwin P. Van Cise
Benjamin F. Stapleton, Jr. Lucius E. Woods

Luis D. Rovira ..............
Richard C. Cockrell
Arthur M. Fratin
Robert C. Hawley

JUNIOR BAR
-----------------------.---------------.........................
Chairman
Michael Morris
Joe S. Reynolds
Rendle Myer
Richard L. Schrepferman
James B. Reed
Alvin Weinberger
LEGAL AID

Mary C. Griffith ............
Edward B. Almon
Robert S. Appel
Joseph E. Cook, Jr.
Richard B. Foley

M ilton
Arnold
Norma
Robert

Wesley W. Forsyth
Mitchel B. Johns
Richard G. Luxford

Ch airman
Frank P. Lynch
Meritt H. Perkins
Thomas R. Walker

...................

LEGAL SERVICE AND LAWYER REFERENCE SERVICE
J. Blake ----------------------------------................................................................ Chairman
Alperstein
John L. Griffith
John F. Kelly
L. Comstock
J. Colin James
James H. Rogers
L. Gee
Stanley Johnson

LEGISLATIVE
------ . . .. . . . . . . .
Ira L. Quiat .................
John C. Banks
Donald W. Hoagland
Harry A. King
George L. Creamer
Joseph B. Dolan
Donald M. Lesher
Lawrence M. Henry

Charles C. Nicola ......
Keith Anderson
William G. Berge
Gordon Johnston

.........................................C hairman
Ranger Rogers
Royal C. Rubright
Arthur T. Smith

MEETINGS
................................................................
Chairm an
Hover T. Lentz
Frank H. Shafroth
Duane 0. Littell
Raymond A. Wagner
Wayne D. Williams
Ralph Sargent, Jr.

July, 1954

DICTA

MEMBERSHIP
Chairman
Francis S. M ancini ..................................................................................................
Richard L. Banta, Jr.
Lennart T. Erickson
E. E. Nevans, Jr.
George F. Barbary
Richard B. Foley
Joseph W. Opstelten
Wilbur F. Denious, Jr.
Thomas A. Gilliam
Stanley H. Schwartz
MINIMUM FEES
Charles E. Grovei.--................................................................................................. Chairman
Harry A. Feder
Jacques A. Machol, Jr.
John H. Tippit
Mark H. Harrington
Wilbur M. Pryor, Jr.
John B. Tweedy
Donald C. McKinlay
Charles Rosenbaum
Ronald V. Yegge
PUBLIC RELATIONS
Robert Bugdanow itz ............................................................................................
Chairvian
John R. Bermingham
Sydney H. Grossman
H. Joe Rawlinson
David Brofman
William P. Horan
Joe S. Reynolds
Victoria Gross
Joseph W. Opstelten
Richard M. Schmidt, Jr.

REAL ESTATE
Edw in J. W ittelshofer ..........................................
............................................ Ch irm (In
ExECUTIVE

L. H. Drath
Golding Fairfield
Gilbert Goldstein

Albert S. Isbill
Donald M. Lesher
Percy S. Morris

Sam Berman
0. Ben Bozeman
Wilbur F. Denious, Jr.
James D. Doyle
Willard H. Freeman
Arthur C. Gregory

Robert T. Haines
Thompson G. Marsh
Harold E. Popham
Howard Roepnack
Stanley H. Schwartz

Simon Quiat
Warren K. Robinson

GENERAL

Maurice Reuler ...........
Nathan Lee Baum
Charles H. Haines, Jr.
Richard D. Hall

Roy S. Scott, Jr.
Mary Seach
James D. Voorhees
William W. Webster
Alvin Weinberger

TOPICAL LUNCHEONS
...............................
....
.......................
Chairmlan
Eugene S. Haines
Royal C. Rubright
William H. Robinson, Jr. Jack Verne Temple
Robert B. Rottman
Charles E. Works

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
Philip A. Rouse ........................................................................................................ Chairman
George F. Barbary
William B. Miller
Gerald M. Quiat
David J. Clarke
Percy S. Morris
Thomas M. Sullivan
William P. Horan
William Rann Newcomb Albert E. Zarlengo

DICTA

Dear Subscriber:
It becomes my extreme pleasure
at this time to announce the completion of a 30-year subject-author index to DICTA.
It is the sincere hope of the students of the University of Denver
College of Law who have effected
the compilation, and of those members of the Bar who helped with useful suggestions, that this publication
will become an asset to you in your
use of DICTA.
A self-addressed card for your
convenience in subscribing to the
index, is being forwarded to you in
the near future. A prompt reply will
greatly help us in determining the
number of copies to print.
Sincerly yours,
DWIGHT A. HAMILTON
Managing Editor
College of Law
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